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NATIONAL AND STATE BANKS.
The national banking system was recommended to Con-
gress by Secretary Chase in his first annual report, December,
1861. He urged its adoption both as a measure of currency
reform and as a means of replenishing the public treasury.
As a matter of fact, the act brought little aid to the treasury
until after the need of it had passed by. The war ended
practically in April, 1865. The whole amount of national
bank notes issued up to the third of that month was only
~98,8g6,488. The sum total of fiscal aid gained by the oper-
ation of the act up to that time therefore did not exceed
$109,000,000, and this was only 3 6- I o per cent of the borrow-
ings of the Government.
THE TAX ON STATE BANKS’ Note.
The national bank bill was not favored by Congress during
the first or the second year of the war. It was reported ad-
versely by the Committee of Ways and Means on the eighth
of July, 1862. In December following the Secretary renewed
his recommendation with great earnestness, and the recom-
mendation was reinforced by President Lincoln in his annual
message. Notwithstanding all this, the opposition to the
measure in Congress was exceedingly stubborn. The bill
was started this time in the Senate, where it was passed
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A few days later it passed the House by seventy-eight to sixty-
four. It was revised and repassed on the third of June in
the following year, but neither in the original nor in the
amended act was there any discriminating tax on State bank
notes. This tax was an afterthought. It was proposed by
Mr. Hooper, of Massachusetts, in the House, on the seven-
teenth of February, 1865, and in the form in which he offered
it, it was defeated. It was again offered in substantially the
shape in which it now stands, on the same day, by Mr. Wil-
son, of Iowa, and it was adopted by an accident. The vote
was sixty-eight yeas to sixty-seven nays, but Mr. Brooks, of
New York, who had bitterly opposed it in debate, voted in
the affirmative in order to move a reconsideration. When
he moved the reconsideration, Mr. Washbume, of Illinois,
moved to lay that motion on the table, and on the latter
motion the vote was a tie, seventy-one to seventy-one. The
speaker then voted in the affirmative, and his vote saved
the Wilson amendment. If Mr. Brooks had voted in the
first instance as he had fought, there would have been a
majority of one against it.
In the Senate the Committee on Finance reported adversely
to the tax, but was overruled by a majority of two. I men-
tion this merely to show how small was the preponderance
of sentiment, if any, in favor of the tax at the time when it
was enacted. Although enacted on the third of March, 1865,
the tax did not go into effect until August i, 1866, or fifteen
months after the close of the war.
The constitutionality of the tax has been called in question.
The Supreme Court held;in the case of Veazie Bank vs. Fenno,
that it was not repugnant to the Constitution. There may
be room for difference of opinion as to the scope of the deci-
sion, but according to my reading the court held that the
right of Congress to tax bank notes existed, and that the
judicial department of the Government could not prescribe
limitations to the legislative department upon the exercise
of its acknowledged powers.
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and economical features of the tax. If you can tax bank notes,
not for the purposes of revenue, i. e. , not for the usual purposes
of taxation, but for something quite different, you may tax
anybody or anything on the same principles. The debate
shows that the tax was imposed to kill State bank notes, not
to obtain money for public uses. Such a power can be in-
voked to destroy any industry, to take away any man’s
livelihood, and to reduce him to beggary. This power was
invoked a few years ago to destroy the oleomargarine indus-
try, and there is now pending a bill, which has passed one
branch of Congress, to tax out of existence the business of
making a certain class of contracts called &dquo; futures.&dquo; This
bill has created far more commotion during the past twelve
months than the tax on State bank notes ever did. It was
and is advocated by some who have no pecuniary interest to
serve, as an anti-gambling statute. Dealing in futures, they
say, is gambling. Ought we not to suppress gambling by
every means in our power ? Whether dealing in futures is
gambling or not, whether some of it is gambling and some
not, I observe that orthodoxy is brought in to give a lift to
every such measure. It was especially so in the oleomarga-
rine case. The making of this article was pronounced im-
moral and even infamous, although it turned out that the
most deceptive and deleterious compounds in the market
going under the name and guise of butter were really butter
done over with chemicals. Now orthodoxy, according to a
well-known formula, is my doxy and heterodoxy is your
doxy. If I want to tax your business out of existence be-
cause it interferes with mine, I shall begin by persuading
Congressmen that you are a bad fellow and that your influ-
ence over the young is pernicious. I confess that I was
captivated with the idea of taxing the Louisiana Lottery out
of existence by act of Congress, but I see now that a better
way was found. I hope, if another round is to be fought
with that monster, that means may be devised for overcoming
it without resort to so doubtful an expedient ; for there is
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you may use the taxing power for other purposes than those
of the public fisc.
But we are confronted with the fact that the thing has been
done. If the means were questionable, still we are not re-
sponsible. The blame, if any, is on the last generation. Are
we required, upon sentimental or other grounds, to undo what
they did, even at the risk of producing chaos ? I consider
the sin of inflicting a bad currency upon the people the
deadliest that a government can commit. Hence it becomes
us, before answering this question, to look at the probable
consequences.
If we are to assume that one of the consequences will be
the circulation of bank notes as bad as some of those which
existed before the war, no further argument is needed. There
were good banks and bad banks before the war. There were
good bank systems and bad bank systems. Let us glance
at some of both kinds.
STATE BANK OF INDIANA.
The State Bank of Indiana was incorporated by a special
charter in i834. The capital stock was originally fixed at
$1,600,000, and of this sum the State was to subscribe
one-half and private individuals the other half. The
State really supplied the whole capital by an issue of
bank bonds, and advanced one-half of it to private
individuals on mortgage security. The capital was
afterwards increased, the State reserving to itself the option
to take one-half of the several increments. All the stock
subscriptions were required to be paid in specie. The State
Bank consisted of a president and board of directors at In-
dianapolis, who were a supervising body, but who had no
capital under their control and transacted none of the details
of the business. All the details were performed by the
branches of the State Bank, originally ten, but increased in
number from time to time. The branches were managed by
the private shareholders exclusively. The stock subscrip-
tions were made by each branch separately, the capital of
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private persons ~80,000. The earnings and dividends of each
branch belonged to their own shareholders exclusively, but
each branch was liable for the debts of every other branch.
They were independent of each other in the matter of assets,
but were united as to liabilities. This was the admirable
keystone of the arch.
The president and four directors of the bank (the parent
institution) were chosen by the State legislature to hold office
for five years, and one director of the same was elected by
each branch.
The kind of business to be done was defined in the law.
It was the usual banking business, including the power to
issue circulating notes. The only limit on the amount of
circulating notes was embraced in a provision that the debts
due to or from any branch (except deposits) should not be
more than double the capital of that branch. Theoretically,
therefore; each or every branch might have notes outstand-
ing to double the amount of its capital minus any debts it
owed to other banks. An amendment was passed in 1836
allowing discounts to be made to the extent of two and one-
half times the capital stock. They were not allowed to lend
on mortgage security or to deal in real estate, except such
as might come to them in the way of security for loans pre-
viously made ; and in such cases they were required to offer
it at public sale once each year.
In order to prevent the branch banks from falling under
the control of individuals or cliques, it was provided that at
elections of directors no person should cast more than 100
votes, however large his holdings might be. Holders of one
to four shares might cast one vote for each share ; four to
thirty shares, one vote for every two shares ; thirty to ninety
shares, one vote for every four shares, and so on-a scheme
of minority representation borrowed from the Massachusetts
law of 1828. No branch could lend money on the security
of its own stock. No officer or director could borrow on
terms different from the public, nor could they endorse for
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interested. On all applications for loans above ~500, a
majority vote of five-sevenths of the board was necessary,
and this must be entered on the minutes with the names of
the directors so voting. Directors were individually liable
for losses resulting from infraction of the law, unless they
had voted against the same and caused their votes to be
entered on the minutes, and had notified the Governor of the
State of such infraction forthwith, and had published their
dissent in the nearest newspaper. Any absent director should
be deemed to have concurred in the action of the board,
unless he should make his dissent known in like manner
within six months.
Such were the leading features of this monumental bank.
It continued until the expiration of its charter to be a great
and beneficent financial institution, highly profitable to its
shareholders and advantageous to the community. When
the crash of 1837 came, it held Government deposits to the
amount of 
~t,5oo,000, all of which it paid in the usual course
of business. The first instalment of this deposit (~80,000
gold) was conveyed in a stage-coach over the Alleghany
Mountains to Washington City, by the late J. F. D. Lanier,
of New York, who was then President of the Madison Branch
Bank. When this money was delivered, the Secretary of the
Treasury (levy Woodbury) said to Mr. Lanier that his bank
was the only one in the country holding Government deposits
that had offered to pay any specie at all.* The bank was
rechartered as the &dquo; Bank of the State of Indiana&dquo; in 1855.
It was one of the few institutions that did not suspend specie
payments in the panic of 1857. The State very properly
ceased to be a shareholder when the first charter expired.
Its participation was deemed necessary in the beginning to
procure the requisite capital, ,but it wisely kept its own hands
off the management. The State banks of Illinois and Ken-
tucky, which were owned wholly by the States, and were
managed by public officers, soon went to smash. That of
*Memoir of J. F. D. Lanker, published by his family.
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cent per annum in dividends, besides nearly doubling the
original capital at the &dquo; round up.&dquo; This money was turned
into the State School Funds
When the State of Indiana adopted a new constitution,
in 1851, a clause was inserted prohibiting the State from
becoming a shareholder in any bank or other corporation.
Another clause authorized the Legislature to pass a general
banking law, and a third clause provided that noteholders
should be preferred creditors of failed banks.
STATE BANK OF OHIO.
The State Bank of Ohio had a different origin and was of
later birth. It was made a part of a banking law of wide
scope passed in 1845. It seems to have been modeled after
the Indiana law, with a few differences. The State of Ohio
had no pecuniary interest in it. There were a number of
banks existing in the State when the law of 1845 was passed,
and the law authorized the formation of others, but restricted
*Mr. I,ucius B. Swift, of Indianapolis, has kindly made a search, at my instance,
for the exact amount of surplus turned over by the branch banks to the State of
Indiana. No record containing all this information was found, but a communi-
cation made by the State Bank under date of January 7,1859, reports the winding
up of nine branches and gives a statement of the surplus returned to shareholders
in addition to the annual dividends and the original capital stock, the par value
of which was $50 per share, viz: 
’
A report of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, dated November i, 1858,
says that the State had received up to that time a net profit, from its bank invest-
ment, of $2,780,6o4.36 after deducting the interest paid on its bank bonds. There
were still some branches which had not’turned in their surplus and were not
included in this statement. Mr. Lanker says that the State’s net profit was about
$3.500,000.
I hav considered it worth while to rescue this notable tribute to sound banking
principles from the weltering mass of bank failures of the period covered. i. e.,
1834-1859.
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commissioners to parcel it out, as though banking were a
necessary evil, like dynamite. The law provided that any
number of banks, not less than seven then existing, or to be
organized thereafter, might become branches of the State
Bank of Ohio. The latter, like the State Bank of Indiana,
was a mere Board of Control, and was so denominated in
the law. The central and governing idea of this law was
the security of the noteholder. Note issuing was propor-
tioned to capital in the following manner: &dquo; Any branch
might issue ~fiaoo,ooo of notes for the first ~100,000 of capital ;
$1 50,ooo of notes for the second $ioo,ooo of capital; ~I25,-
ooo of notes for the third $ioo,ooo of capital; $100,000
of notes for the fourth $ioo,ooo of capital, and ~75,000 of
notes for each additional $100,000 of capital. Each branch
was required to deposit with the Board of Control ten per
cent of the amount of its circulating notes, either in specie
or in bonds of the State of Ohio or of the United States, as
a safety fund for the protection of the holders of notes of any
or all the branches. The Board of Control might invest any
money belonging to the safety fund in the bonds of Ohio or
of the United States, or in mortgage on real estate in the
county where the branch was situated, worth double the
amount of the loan exclusive of buildings or other destructi-
ble property. Each branch was liable for the circulating
notes, but not for the general debts of the other branches.
In case of the failure of any branch to redeem its notes, the
Board of Control was to make an assessment pro rata on the
other branches, and reimburse them as soon as the assets in
the safety fund could be disposed of; and then the safety
fund was to be reimbursed out of the assets of the failed
branch before any other creditor was paid. The State Bank
of Ohio had thirty-six branches and was highly successful.
LOUISIANA BANK ACT OF 1842.
The State of Louisiana had her full share of bank misery
in 1837 and later. Her banks suspended specie payments,
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banking law which was, in nearly all respects, a model for
other States and countries.
The principal features of this law were the requirement (i)
of a specie reserve equal to one-third of all its liabilities to
the public ; (2) the other two-thirds of its liabilities to be
represented by commercial paper having not more than ninety
days to run ; (3) all commercial paper to be paid at maturity ;
and if not paid, or if an extension were asked for, the
account of the party to be closed and his name to be sent to
the other banks as a delinquent; (4) all banks to be exam-
ined by a board of State officers quarterly or oftener ; (5)
bank directors to be individually liable for all loans or invest-
ments made in violation of the law, unless they could show
that they had voted against the same if present; (6) no bank
to have less than fifty shareholders, having at least thirty
shares each ; (7) any director going out of the State for more
than thirty days, or absenting himself from five successive
meetings of the board, to be deemed to have resigned, and
his vacancy to be filled at once ; (8) no bank to pay out any
notes but its own; (9) all banks to pay their balances to
each other in specie every Saturday, under penalty of being
immediately put in liquidation ; (ro) no bank to purchase its
own shares or lend on its own shares more than thirty per
cent of the market value thereof.
This law had one feature which cannot be approved. It
allowed some loans to be made on mortgage security, but it
restricted such loans to the bank’s capital. No part of the
deposits could be lent except on commercial paper maturing
within ninety days. I judge that not many mortgage loans
were made by the Louisiana banks, since none of them sus-
pended in the panic of 1857, although most of the banks of the
country were temporarily closed by that catastrophe. Mort-
gage loans are all right in themselves, but they are no part of
the banking business. I think that the Louisiana Bank Act
of 1842 was eminently scientific. It was the first law passed
by any State requiring a definite amount of specie to be kept
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as a reserve. The Louisiana law required no pledged
security for the circulating notes of banks, nor did it put any
limit on the amount of their issues. All this was covered,
and amply covered, by requiring thirty-three per cent of
specie against all liabilities, whether deposits or notes, the
balance of the assets to be in mercantile paper having not
more than ninety days to run.
Under this law, Louisiana became in i 86o the fourth State
in the Union in point of banking capital and the second
in point of specie holdings. I. think, however, that the
requirement of a thirty-three per cent reserve of coin (or, as
we say now, of &dquo; lawful money &dquo;) was excessive, and that
the twenty-five per cent in larger cities and fifteen per cent
in other places, required of national banks, is ample. It is
a matter of history that the Louisiana Bank Act of i 842 was
strictly and intelligently enforced until the city of New
Orleans was captured during the civil war.
MASSACHUSETTS AND THE SUFFOLK BANK SYSTEM.
The Massachusetts Banking Law, as it existed before the
war, consisted of two parts, the first part relating to chartered
banks. This was one of the best banking laws ever pro-
duced. No individual could hold more than one-half the
stock of any bank, no person could be a director of more
than one bank, no person could be a director whose
stock was pledged for debt. Neither the debts nor the
credits of a bank could exceed twice the capital stock paid
in, except for deposits and for debts to or from other banks.
Directors were personally liable for violation of this clause
unless they dissented or were absent, in which case they
must notify the Bank Commissioners of the State forthwith.
No bank could pay out any notes but its own, or issue any
notes, directly or indirectly, except at its own banking-
house, or issue any notes with the understanding that they
should be kept out a certain length of time. No bank could
make a loan repayable in anything except specie or its own
notes. In case of bank failure the noteholders were to be
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paid first. Each bank was required to keep fifteen per cent
of specie as a reserve against both circulation and deposits,
but country banks might reckon their balances in Boston
banks payable on demand as specie. This specie-reserve
clause was passed in 1858, after a hard struggle. It was
copied from the Louisiana Act of i 842, but the amount of the
specie reserve was only one-half of that required in Louisiana. *
When gold was paid out, it must be paid by weight. This
was an old law of 1803 re-enacted at every revision of the
banking laws down to and including 1860. There was a
provision that if any new banks were chartered with greater
privileges than those here enumerated, the same privileges
should extend to all other banks. This proviso was in-
serted in the Act of 1828 and in every subsequent revision.
The Act of 1828 provided that at elections for bank directors
each stockholder should be entitled to one vote for the first
share and to one vote for every two additional shares, pro-
vided that no person should have more than ten votes.
This was re-enacted in the revision of 1835, but was dropped
in the revision of 1860. The second part of the Massachusetts
law was the free banking system. It was passed in 1851 and
re-enacted in the revision of 1860, but as only -seven banks
were organized under it we need not dwell on its provisions.
The distinguishing feature of Massachusetts banking was
the daily redemption of all New England bank notes
that reached Boston. This redemption took place at the
Suffolk Bank, and hence was called the Suffolk Bank sys-
tem. It was a voluntary arrangement like a clearing-house.
It began in 1825. The country banks resisted it at first,
but they were forced into it by a systematic&dquo; ‘ run &dquo; on every
one that did not come in and provide for the redemption of
its notes at the financial centre. The Suffolk Bank system
was facilitated by the provision of law that no bank could pay
out any notes except its own, but it began before that law
was passed. In this way the goodness of all circulating
notes was subjected to a daily test.
*See Bankers’ Magazine, November, 1877, page 351.
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It is important to observe that in each of the three systems
we have examined, viz., the State Bank of Indiana and the
Louisiana and Massachusetts laws, the governing principle
was that the bank’s assets should redeem its circulating
notes. They rested upon the true theory that any system
which takes diligent care of the assets will surely take care
of the circulation, and they demonstrated in a long series of
years by splendid results that such assurance is not beyond
the reach of the State’s administrative powers.
FREE BANKING LAW OF New YORK.
The next great step in the evolution of banking in the
United States was what is called the free-bank system. Not-
withstanding the praise that has been bestowed upon it, and
notwithstanding its adoption as one feature of the National
Banking Law, I think that it was a step backward and that.
it is destined to perish. It had its origin in the State of
New York in 1838, although the State of Michigan had
something resembling it a year earlier. Prior to that time
bank charters in New York were a part of the spoils system
of politics. Accustomed as we are to the spoils system of
to-day, it sounds oddly to read that bank charters were
granted by Whig and Democratic Legislatures only to their
own partisans. Not only was this the common practice, but
the shares in banks, or the rights to subscribe to them, were
parceled out by political ‘‘ bosses &dquo; in the several counties.
Of course, corruption flourished in such a soil., The people
became exasperated by the indecencies witnessed at Albany.
A reaction in favor of equal rights was the natural conse-
quence, and out of this came the Free-Banking Law of 1838.
Under this law the comptroller was authorized to issue cir-
culating notes to any association organizing itself as a bank
and depositing stocks of the United States, or of any State,
or bonds secured by mortgage on real estate of a certain
specified grade. The system had a bad start. Within five
years after the law was passed twenty-nine banks that had
organized under it failed, and the deposited securities realized
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only seventy-four cents on the dollar of the outstanding
notes. This led to changes in the law by which all State
bonds were ruled out except those of New York, and the
mortgage securities were keyed up to a high pitch, but still
not high enough. Under the present banking law of New
York (revision of 1892) the security required for circulating
notes consists of the bonds of the United States, or of the
State of New York, or of any county or incorporated city in
the State, or of mortgages on improved real property worth
seventy-five per cent more than the loan. Individual bankers
can issue circulating notes on the same terms.
The free-banking system was adopted in Ohio in I845,
but did not flourish there, because it came in competition
with the State Bank and branches that were started at the
same time. It was adopted in Massachusetts in 1851, as has
been remarked, but it gained no foothold there because it
was really inferior to the Suffolk Bank system, which already
held the ground.
FREE BANKING IN THE WEST.
The State of Illinois passed her Free-Banking Law in
1851. It was submitted to a vote of the people in Novem-
ber of that year and ratified. It provided that any number
of persons might organize a bank, but that no bank should
have a less capital than $50,000. It did not require that a
bank should have any directors. The bank’s capital might
consist wholly of bonds of States or the United States de-
posited with the State Auditor as security for its circulating
notes. The auditor could deliver to the bank in circulating
notes eighty per cent. of the market value of the securities.
No examination of the affairs of the banks by public
officers could be had except on the affidavit of the share-
holders, and then only for the purpose of ascertaining the
safety of the investments. A subsequent amendment pro-
vided for an annual examination by bank commissioners of
the securities deposited against circulating notes. The banks
were allowed to pay out the notes of any specie-paying banks
of the United States or of Canada, no matter how remote.
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These are all the essential provisions of the Free-Banking
Law of Illinois as it existed before the war. You will ob-
serve that the only idea in the law is security for circulating
notes. Each bank was a kind of slot machine. You dropped
in a State bond and a lot of bank notes came out, and
that was all the banking that was expected or contemplated
in the law.
The Free-Banking Law of Indiana, passed May 28, 1852,
was very similar to that of Illinois. The differences were,
that in Indiana the auditor might issue circulating notes to
the full amount (instead of eighty per cent.) of the securities
deposited, and that each bank must have specie in its own
vaults equal to twelve and one-half per cent. of its circulat-
ing notes.
The Free-Banking Law of Wisconsin, passed in 185_3,
was, perhaps, the worst of all. It did violence to banking
principles in a variety of ways. It allowed the bank comp-
troller to issue circulating notes to the full amount of the
bonds of States deposited with him by banks. It allowed
the comptroller also to receive the first~ mortgage bonds of
any railroad in the State twenty miles long, or divisional.
mortgage bonds on sections of road of not less than forty
miles, such road to be first inspected as to its physical con-
dition by the govenior, the attorney-general and the bank
comptroller, or any two of them. On such securities eighty
per cent. of circulating notes could be issued, and one-half
of the securities of any bank might consist of railroad bonds
of this description. Directors or stockholders were required
to give their personal bonds to the extent of one-fourth of the
amount of the circulating notes, as security against depreci-
ation of the other securities. Except in this particular the
shareholders were not liable beyond the amount of their
capital invested. The banks might lend money on real estate
security to any extent.
CAUSES OF THEIR FAILURE.
Most of these so-called free banks turned out to be bad
when the first real test came. Out of ninety-four free banks
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in Indiana fifty-one had suspended even before the panic of
1857. The theory of their existence was that, if bank notes
were secured by the pledge of marketable bonds or stocks
lodged in the hands of a State officer, it was of no conse-
quence what else the bank had or did not have. The idea
that a bank’s assets should redeem its notes did not enter
into this scheme at all. Since there were examples of good
banking present to the eyesight, like the State Bank of
Indiana, we may reasonably ask why such a mistake was
made. I can only answer this question in one way. Bank-
ing made itself known to the great mass of the community
only through failed bank notes. One failed bank of small
calibre would make more impression on the public mind
than a dozen others which never closed their doors. This is
on the principle that one lost sheep gives its owner more
concern than ninety-nine that go not astray. So the legis-
lative mind, which generally follows the public mind, became
exclusively fixed on security for bank notes, to the neglect
of all other branches of the business.
In practice it was hardly necessary for the bank to have a
place of business if its notes were secured, and I remember
that in some instances where attempts were made in Illinois
to present notes for redemption at the bank’s counter no
counter was found, but merely a hired room in some place
remote from any railway station and situated on some
bottomless prairie road. As the country banks had a de-
cided advantage over the city banks in the way of nest-
hiding, the latter resorted first to the device of not paying
out their own notes at all, but borrowing those of Eastem
banks instead. Facilities for travel were too good, however,
in the East. The notes paid out in Illinois and Wisconsin
went home to be converted into New York and Boston funds
too rapidly. So the city bankers went to the State of
Georgia and started a lot of subordinate banks there, with
whose notes they flooded the Northwest from Chicago as a
radiating point. None of these currency mills actually
failed, but the rate of exchange on New York was measured
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by the cost of sending the notes to their several Georgia
houses for redemption, which cost was at that time con-
siderable.
The Western free banks for the most part went down in
the crash of 1857, and again in that of 1861, and their
securities being pressed on the market simultaneously sank
to low figures, the notes falling even lower than the securi-
ties. Whatever may have been the design of the law-makers
(and there is no reason for doubting that it was good), it
turned out to be a mere scheme to enable speculators to sell
bonds to the public, and continue to draw the interest them-
selves. It was possible under these laws for a man to
borrow, say, $ioo,ooo of State bonds, deposit them with the
auditor, receive from him circulating notes, buy wheat with
these notes, send the wheat to New York, and sell it for
money with which to buy more bonds to deposit with the
auditor, and so round and round. This was actually done
in some cases, and it was considered an effective way of pro-
curing an adequate supply of money.
BUYING BAD MONEY.
What would have happened if this supply had not existed?
Why, of course, the wheat would have reached its market
all the same, and would have been sold for good money, and
this money would have gone to the wheat-producer, instead
of the wild-cat and red-dog notes that the State auditor put
his name and seal on, that were so handsome to look at, and
that we were all so proud of in the beginning. I remember
how independent we all felt when we had some of these
triumphs of art in our pocket-books.
A process of essentially the same kind for furnishing a
supply of money has been going on in this country during
the past fourteen years. The Government has been issuing
circulating notes of one kind and another on the basis of
silver, and although some $400,000,000 of these notes have
been put in circulation, money is not a whit more plentiful
than it was before. What would have happened if not a
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single silver note had been issued, or a single ounce of silver
bought? Why, the products of the country would have
been sold all the same, and in the absence of silver and silver
notes we should have had gold and gold notes. But, says
some one, there is not gold enough in the world. How do
you know that ? You, or the likes of you, said the same
thing before we resumed specie payments. You said the
same thing before Italy resumed. And now Austria-Hun-
gary is preparing to resume, and largely with gold drawn
from us. Simultaneously we hear (and I believe it is true)
that Russia has stored away $5°0,000,000 of gold. I have
not the smallest doubt that Austria-Hungary will get all the
gold she needs for this purpose, and that there will still be
some left. I know, too, that the ability of this country to
draw gold from the world’s stock exceeds that of Austria-
Hungary and Russia combined, and that if we wanted more
gold we could get it. The first step would be to repeal the
present Silver Law: I doubt if anything else would be
needed. Mr. Buckle, in his &dquo; History of Civilization,&dquo;
showed that the world’s progress in the last hundred years
had consisted chiefly in repealing bad laws. There is
abundance of room left for that kind of progress in our own
country.
THE ‘‘BANKING PRINCIPLE.&dquo;
The State Bank of Indiana, the Louisiana and the Massa-
chusetts banks were based upon what is known to economists
as the ‘‘ banking principle,&dquo; the opposite, or counterpart, of
which is called the &dquo; currency principle.&dquo; The banking
principle affirms that all trade is barter, that men would
swap their goods and services directly, and without the use
of money, if they could, but that since they cannot (owing
to the complexity of human affairs), any machine which
will do this swapping is a saving and a gain to mankind.
This is what a clearing-house does on a large scale, and a
bank on a smaller one. A, B, and C, and the rest of the
alphabet deposit the money they get for their various indus-
tries and services in a bank, and then draw their checks for
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what they want to buy. This is the same as though they
deposited their various goods in the bank and gave to each
other orders for goods payable in kind at the bank. There
would be practical difficulties in making the division at the
bank and in handling the goods, but the essential nature of
the operation is not changed by bringing in another set of
hands (namely, merchants) to transfer the goods and make
the divisions. The fact is, that all trade is at bottom barter
and swapping.
Now the issue and circulation of bank notes is only an
extension of the bank-check system. It carries swapping
by machinery one step further. The checks of an individual
often circulate through three or four hands before they reach
the bank for payment. The bank note is the cashier’s check
on the bank. These cashiers’ checks circulate more widely
than private checks because the bank’s credit is more widely
known, and because they are of convenient form and size.
They enable the community to make small exchanges, to do
small swapping, without the use of real money. Since real
money is capital, they economize the use of capital.
THE ’’ CURRENCY PRINCIPLE.’’
The currency principle proceeds upon a theory somewhat
different. It assumes that a certain amount of paper notes
will be wanted by the public at all times, will always be
passing from hand to hand, and will never be presented for
redemption. This assumption is based upon experience, and
is much the same as assuming that a certain number of hats
or pairs of trousers will always be wanted. This amount the
Government itself will furnish. In England the bank issues
this amount of notes, but it accounts to the Government for
the profit over and above expenses, and a fair compensation
for its own trouble. When the Bank Act was passed, the
amount of the fiduciary issues of notes was fixed at
~14,000,000. Upon this the bank was to make an annual
payment of y 20,000, besides paying all the expenses of the
note issue and managing the public debt. It was provided
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also that on the discontinuance of the circulation of certain
country banks then in existence the Bank of England should
have the right to issue a corresponding amount of notes,
paying a tax to the Government thereon, at the rate of two
per cent. per annum. The net amount received by the Gov-
ernment from the bank last year was ~ I62, 7I6. The
fiduciary issue is based on Government securities. If the com-
munity wants any more notes than the fiduciary issue (which
is now about 
~’i5,5oo,000), it can have them by paying gold
for them. But obviously this is the same as using the gold,
since a note issued against five sovereigns is merely like a
gold certificate of deposit issued by our Treasury. True,
there is no external mark to distinguish this Bank of Eng-
land note from any one of the £15,500,000 issued against
securities, but it is a very different thing in fact. The Bank
of England is a perfect representative of the currency prin-
ciple, and the Bank of France is a perfect representative of
the banking principle.
THE &dquo;TRUE PRINCIPLE.&dquo;
The banking principle is the true one in theory. It is a
labor-saving and capital-saving machine at the same time.
It does for the lesser transactions of commerce what the bill
of exchange and the clearing-house do for the greater ones,
and in the same way substantially. It enables trade to be
carried on to any extent within the limits of a single nation
by a series of offsets. It is barter reduced to science. If
there were no disturbing elements, it would gradually root
out and supersede every other kind of apparatus for perform-
ing the exchanges of mankind. It would do this in the same
way and for the same reason that a superior tool crowds out
and supersedes an inferior one-as the friction match, for
example, superseded the flint and tinder-box. But there are
disturbing elements. Bad and dishonest management of
banks may be minimized, but cannot be prevented altogether.
The currency principle here has its raison d’etre. It says that
the first requisite of any bank-note system is the security of the
noteholder, and that everything else should be subordinated
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to that. I agree to that proposition. Any system which
does not make the noteholders secure is condemned at the
start. But we have seen that the issue of notes against depos-
ited securities did not save the noteholders from loss before
the war, while careful and intelligent systems of banking like
those of Louisiana, Massachusetts, and the State banks of In-
diana and Ohio did protect them fully. I consider note issuing
against deposited securities erroneous in principle, because it
uses up the bank’s capital in procuring its notes, whereas,
it ought to have this capital free at the outset for the discount
of commercial paper.
Take an illustration. Suppose that a bank starts with
$100,000 of capital. Under the plan of deposited securities
it must pay all this, and perhaps more, in order to get ~90,000
of notes to apply to the discount of commercial paper. The
bank cannot know whether the parties whose paper is dis-
counted will draw the money in the form of notes or will ask
for drafts on some other city or will draw checks which will
turn up at the clearing-house the next day. If the parties
draw out the notes, these may come back as deposits the
next day.
The notes are assets while the bank holds them,
but they are liabilities when the public holds them. Hatch
dollar has cost the bank $1.10 and the notes will perform no
function that the notes of the old State Bank of Indiana
would not perform. Now, suppose that the noteholder could
be made safe without the deposited security. Then the bank
would have $ioo,ooo of free capital to start with, plus as
many notes as the community would draw out and make use
of. This amount of notes is all that it can put out, even
when it buys them from the Government at ~r. ro each.
Therefore the $ioo,ooo of free capital is clear gain to the
banking business. But, you say, the bank has the interest
on the deposited bonds. Yes, that is what it gets out of a
permanent investment, but banks are, or ought to be, organ-
ized for discounting short-time commercial paper, and not for
long-time loans. If long-time loans are wanted in the
 at The University of Iowa Libraries on June 18, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
21
banking business, which I respectfully deny, more money
can be made by lending on mortgage than by lending to
governments.
BANKING ON SECURITIES CANNOT LONG SURVIVE.
I have said that I think that the system of note-issuing on
deposited securities is destined to perish. Not only is it
erroneous in that it absorbs the bank’s capital before its doors
are opened for business, but the only securities fit to be used
for this purpose are rapidly disappearing and will soon be
gone. The note-issuing feature of the national-bank system
is moribund already. But the banking feature will not die,
even if note-issuing comes to an end. It is so interwoven
with the commerce of the country that it will stand, and
necessarily stand, for an indefinitely long period with or
without note issues. The note circulation of the national
banks reached its maximum of three hundred and thirty-six
millions in December, 1872. At that time the number of
banks was 1940 and their capital four hundred and eighty-
two millions. In September, 1891, the circulation had fallen
to one hundred and thirty-one millions, while the number of
banks had risen to 3677 and the capital to six hundred and
seventy-seven millions. This proves that the system is bene-
ficial and is approved by business interests, altogether apart
from the note-issuing feature. The reason why is not far to
seek. The public have more confidence in the machinery of
governmental oversight and enforcement of law, under the
national system, than they have under State systems, and
this they will continue to have even though some State sys-
tems are as good or better. They know that the national
system is uniform. It operates in the same way in Wash-
ington City and Washington State and everywhere between.
When you know this law and the decisions of the courts
under it, you know all that is necessary. If you undertake
to learn and keep track of the banking laws and decisions
of forty-four States and four Territories, you will find your
task a heavy one. There is now a movement on foot to se-
cure uniformity of law in the States touching the marriage
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relation, wills, conveyances of land, and some other things.
As we actually have uniformity of law on the subject of
banking, we had best keep it.
HOW TO PRESERVE THE NATIONAL SYSTEM.
Although note-issuing is not a necessary part of the busi-
ness of banking, it is a vastly desirable part. As has been
shown, it is a device for saving both labor and capital in ef-
fecting exchanges among men. Hence we may assume that
it will sooner or later supplant the present costly method of
supplying a currency by means of silver bullion. I think
that the national bank note can be preserved and even im-
proved, without bond security, by a slight change in the
present law, viz.:
Out of the present tax on bank notes constitute a safety
fund to be lodged in the treasury, the amount of it to be
computed by actuaries, taking the national bank mortality
of the past twenty-five years as a basis. After this sum is
reached, let the tax go into the treasury of the United States,
as it does now, as a part of the national revenue. Let the
Government continue, as now, to be responsible for the notes,
and let it retain, as now, a first lien on the assets of failed
banks and on the liability of the shareholders.
I am assuming, of course, that all the provisions of the
existing law except bond security are retained and enforced,
so that the ratio of bank mortality shall not increase. The
report of the comptroller of the currency for 1891 x shows
that there have been 164 national bank failures since the sys-
tem first went into operation. The total amount of circulat-
ing notes of these banks outstanding at the time of the
failure was $ 16,209, 1 6o. It would take no very long time
to collect this whole sum out of the tax on national bank
notes, but of course, only a small part of this would be
wanted at any one time. This sixteen millions of failed
bank notes was all that the whirligig of time brought in from
April 14, 1865, to October 14, 1891, twenty-six and a half
years. Probably a safety fund, beginning with $5,000,000,
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and replenished from time to time out of the proceeds of the
tax, would be ample. But suppose it were not. We would
still have a first lien on the assets. The assets of these 164
failed banks realized 
~q.4,6ob,56I, or nearly three times the
amount of their circulating notes. I think it would be en-
tirely safe for the Government to continue its responsibility
for the notes on these conditions. We must bear in mind
that almost all the banks are sound, and honestly managed,
the proportion of bad ones to good ones being as 164 to 3677,
or less than five per cent.
BANK FAILURES WOULD NOT INCREASE.
Would the privilege of note-issuing without bond security
tend to an increase of bank failures ? Would rascals take
advantage of the new facilities for note-issuing in order to
swindle the public ? This is an important question. We
have been so accustomed to bond security for bank-notes that
we have lost sight of some other requirements of the law,
of equal or greater importance. One of these is that every
bank must have a paid-up capital and that every shareholder
shall be liable for as much more as he has paid in. More-
over, if any bank’s capital is impaired at any time, it must
be made good. The bona-fide existence of the original capital
and the restoration of it, if impaired, are secured by exami-
nations by public officers. Moreover, no bank can issue
notes in excess of ninety per cent. of its paid-in capital, while
the larger ones are restricted to 80, 75, and 60 per cent.
according to their size. Moreover, every bank must have a
sum equal to five per cent. of its outstanding notes on deposit
at Washington for current redemption purposes. All these
provisions are in the way of protection to the note-holder, and
they are solid provisions too.
We can now answer the question whether the suggested
change in the national banking act will serve as an incentive
to deliberate swindling, and thus increase the amount of
bank mortality over and above the experience of the past
twenty-six years, which we have seen is less than five per
 at The University of Iowa Libraries on June 18, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
24
cent. I think that five per cent. of failed bank notes can
always be provided for out of the proposed safety fund,
without trenching upon the assets of the bank or the added
liability of the shareholders, although I would retain the first
lien on the same which the Government now holds for this
purpose. I do not believe that people are deliberately going
to risk 100 per cent. of their own capital in order to have the
chance of cheating to the extent of ninety per cent. of it, and
running the risk of the State prison besides. This answers
the question whether the suggested change in the law will
serve as an incentive to deliberate swindling, or not. I think
that the law will be enforced as well and as thoroughly
in the future as it has been in the past, probably more so,
since each bank failure teaches the comptroller’s office some
lesson. We ought not to stand shivering over the approaching
wreck of the national bank-note system. Those who think
that it ought to be preserved should be willing to try some
experiments. This world is not made up principally of cheats
and rascals. The preponderance of honest and capable men
in the banking business, as we can prove, is more than ninety-
five per cent. But if worst comes to worst-if bank mortality
should increase under the proposed change-Congress is
always at hand to make needed amendments to the law.
Wisdom will not die with us.
THE &dquo;SAFETY-FUND PRINCIPI,P~.&dquo;
The safety-fund principle is no new one in our history. It
was adopted in New York as long ago as 1829. Each bank
was required by law to pay to the State Treasurer one-half
per cent. on its capital stock until three per cent. is accumu-
lated. By some mistake or accident in framing the law, the
safety fund was made applicable to the payment of all the
debts of failed banks instead of the circulating notes only.
The preliminary discussion shows that the intention was to
protect noteholders only. The contributions to the fund began
win 1831. In r 835 the number of safety-fund banks was seventy-
six, with a circulation Of$14, 000,000. The amount in the safety
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fund was $400,000. During the first twelve years of its opera-
tion no safety-fund bank failed, and the fund was not drawn
upon, for although thepanic of 1837 had supervened, the suspen-
sion of specie payments was legalized for one year, at the end of
which time all the banks resumed. In 1841 six safety-fund
banks failed, there being ninety contributing banks at that time
time and $841,000 in the fund. Then the mistake of making
the fund applicable to all the liabilities of the failed banks,
instead of confining it to circulating notes, was discovered.
Litigation and injunctions, delay and consequent depreciation
of notes followed, which we have not time to recapitulate.
They have been carefully compiled by the late John Jay
Knox.* The upshot is that if the safety fund had been appli-
cable only to the circulating notes, it would have redeemed
every failed bank note during the twenty-five years that the
system lasted. Millard Fillmore, who was comptroller of the
State in 1848, gives, in his report of that year, the exact
figures up to that time. He shows that the contributions to
the safety fund had been $1,876,063 and the notes of the
failed banks $1,548,558, leaving a surplus of $~3a7,$os as
against circulation. This is perhaps the most pregnant fact in
the history of banking in this country. The safety-fund system
and the bond-security system ran side by side with each other
in New York for nearly a quarter of a century, with compar-
ative results decidedly in favor of the former. Comptroller
Flagg, in his report for the year 1846, says : &dquo; In the security
of the public under each system, our experience in the failure
of ten safety-fund banks, and about three times as many of
free banks, proves that the contributions of one-half of one
per cent. annually on the capital of the safety-fund banks
have thus far afforded as much protection as the deposit with
the comptroller by the free banks of a sum nominally equal to
all the bills issued by them. It will be seen by reference to a
statement under the head of insolvent free banks, that the loss
to billholders, on the supposition that all the securities had
been stocks of this State, and bonds and mortgages, would
*See Rlwdes’ Journal of Banking, April, 1893.
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have been over sixteen per cent., while the actual loss has.
been nearly thirty-nine per cent.&dquo; The constitution of
New York, adopted in 1846, makes noteholders preferred
creditors of all failed banks. It may be remarked here that
this preference of the claims of noteholders upon the assets-
of failed banks has become an axiom in banking law and
science, and is no longer called in question.
The late Mr. Knox, whose authority is far greater than
mine on any banking question, argued in his report as comp-
troller of the currency for 1882, against the safety-fund plan
and all other plans for keeping the national bank-note system
alive without bond security. I mention this lest I may seem
to have overlooked it. Mr. Knox changed his mind on this
subject completely a few years before his death, as he told
me and others.
It is proper, nevertheless, to notice one of the arguments
in his 1882 report, viz.: That although the assets of failed
banks when taken together are ample to reimburse the Gov-
ernment for the redemption of failed bank notes, yet some
bank failures are worse than others, and some of them would
leave hardly anything in the way of assets. Of course, we
could not make good the deficit of one bank with the excess
of others. The State of New York once had a similar diffi-
culty to deal with. When she discovered that the blundering
legislation of 1829 bad left a shortage in the safety fund, she
made it good by an issue of her own bonds and reimbursed
herself out of the safety fund when subsequently replenished.
The National Government could do the same, and having
the taxing power always in hand would not need to wait long
for reimbursement. For Mr. Knox’s later views, see an
officially published &dquo; Interview between the Committee on
Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives and
John Jay knox, on the i6th day of January, i8go,&dquo; page 14.
The comptroller of the currency in his last report recom-
mends an extension of the present bonded debt of the United
States for twenty, thirty and forty years beyond its present
term at two per cent. interest for the purpose of continuing
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the national bank notes. There are serious objections to this
plan from political and economical points of view, but an
equally serious one from the banking point of view is that
it is inadequate. If carried out, it would leave the banks
just where they are now. There is no profit in banking on
a two per cent. bond. 2‘he present marasmus would be con-
tinued indefinitely. We hope for something better. We
ought to strive for a system that will be really elastic and
responsive to the wants of trade. The present system is as
stiff as a ram’s horn and almost as crooked. One popu-
lar argument brought against the national banking system
is that in order to get ~90 of circulation we must first with-
draw $ioo from the community. This is a valid criticism as
regards the localities not provided, or inadequately provided,
with banks.
An objection may be raised in reference to the source of
the proposed safety fund. This source is the present tax on
national bank notes. It may be said, on the one hand, that
this is a part of the national revenue and that it cannot be
spared, and on the other hand that if it can be spared it
ought to be repealed. In answer to the latter objection I
venture to say that this tax never will be repealed until
some way is found to carry on government without revenue.
Moreover it ought not to be repealed. As regards the
Government’s need of this particular item of revenue : The
tax for the fiscal year i8gi amounted to $1,216, io4-a very
small amount in the sum total of Government receipts, but
I agree that at the present time the treasury needs to look
after its sixpences. This tax is one per cent. per annum on
circulation. If the requirement of low-interest bond security
were relaxed, the tax might be doubled without harm or in-
justice. We have seen that the Government of England
exacts two per cent. interest or tax from the bank on all
fiduciary note issues over and above the original ~1~,000,000.
But if such a tax should be really oppressive under the new
conditions, the excess would be remitted as soon as the
safety fund had reached the required limit.
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I should consider it indispensable that the Government
should continue to be, as it is now; responsible for the note
issues. I think that any government, national or State,
should be responsible for everything that it allows to circu-
late as money. A right step in this regard was taken in the
Silver-Purchase Act of July 14, 1890, which makes the Gov-
ernment responsible for the redemption of the silver notes in
gold. True, this act is only declaratory of the policy of the
United’States, but it is mandatory upon any honest secre-
tary of the treasury, and I venture to say will never be
departed from.
BANK-NOTE INFLATION.
The question may be asked, what is to be the limit to
national bank notes issued in this way ? At present the
limit is fixed by the deposited securities. What guarantee
shall we have against currency inflation, if currency can be
had on such cheap terms ? The answer is that the law now
limits the circulation of banks to ninety per cent. of the paid-
in capital of the smaller ones, and to eighty, seventy-five and
sixty per cent. of the larger ones. We do not propose to
alter that, although we have seen that the State Bank of
Indiana was allowed to issue notes to the amount of double
its capital, and the banks of Louisiana could issue without
any limit at all, and that these institutions were almost the
only ones in the country that did not suspend in the panic
of 1857. There is hardly time to go into an argument to
show that there can be no such thing, under modem condi-
tions, as bank-note inflation on a gold basis. I might quote
many authorities on this point, but I will refer you to the
latest treatise on banking, and one of the best I am acquainted
with-that of Professor Dunbar. This author shows in simple
language, and with illustrations that anybody can under-
stand, that a bank is powerless either to put out notes or to
keep them out. That power resides exclusively in the hands
of those who hold checks on the bank and have the right to
draw money from it. What is called bank-note inflation is
a consequence and not a cause of general inflation. You all
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remember, doubtless, the commercial crisis of 1873, and if
you do, you remember that the requirement of bond security
for bank notes did not prevent it from being one of the most
disastrous panics in our history.
STATE BANK NOTES.
If the plan here sketched, or something like it, should bet
adopted, there would be no need of State bank notes, since
every facility that a State could grant for the issue of a
sound and safe currency would be granted by the National
Government. I take it that nobody is in favor of an un-
sound or unsafe currency. I feel sure that any political
party which fathers an unsound or unsafe currency will be
severely dealt with at the polls. I know that there is a deep-
seated prejudice against national banks, but that prejudice
grows out of a belief that the banks draw interest on the
bonds and on the notes at the same time, and thus make a
double profit. It cannot exist if there are no bonds
there, but if, in place thereof, each bank is required to
contribute to a safety fund. Probably such a measure
would put an end to silver purchases, since there could
no longer be any apprehension or pretence of a shortage
of currency. The danger of free coinage of silver has,
in my judgment, passed away, notwithstanding some mut-
terings on the horizon, leaving nothing but the Purchase
Act as a disturbing element.
In conclusion, gentlemen, I remark that you havegot to do
something. Time is running on. The national-bank system
is running out, and nothing is taking its place. Every in-
structed person knows that governments have no facilities
for furnishing money to their people, and ought never to do
such a thing, and never can do so without producing mis-
chief. All the financial heresies of the past quarter of a
century have had their origin in the Legal Tender Act of
1862. This has been the parent of an unnumbered progeny
of wrong ideas. To give a history of all the bad monetary
conceits that have been enacted into law, or are waiting to
 at The University of Iowa Libraries on June 18, 2015ann.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
30
be enacted, or have been killed or temporarily stunned dur-
ing the past quarter of a century, would take more time than
we have at our disposal. The largest part of my work as a
journalist during that period has consisted in clubbing
financial heresies which have had their root in the Legal
Tender Act, and would otherwise never have existed.
New York City,
HORACE WHITE.
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